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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 890643-CA 
v. : 
GEORGE OLIVER DUMAS, : Priority 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions of one first degree 
felony, two second degree felonies and a third degree felony. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal based upon the 
order of the Utah Supreme Court transferring the case to this 
Court dated October 31, 1989; and based upon Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Could defendant be convicted of three separate 
theft by receiving charges where the evidence established that 
defendant received the stolen goods at different times? 
2. Did defendant waive any objection he had to defects 
in the information by failing to make a timely objection? 
3. Was the evidence sufficient to support the judge's 
verdict of guilty of three counts of theft by deception? 
4. Was defendant properly found to be an habitual 
criminal even though one of the two previous convictions occurred 
prior to enactment of the habitual criminal statute? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with three counts of theft 
by receiving, one third degree felony and two second degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989); 
and being a habitual criminal, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-1001 (1978). Judge Timothy R. Hanson presided over the 
non-jury trial in Third District Court, in and for Summit County. 
Judge Hanson found defendant guilty of all three theft counts on 
August 9, 1989 and found him guilty of being a habitual criminal 
on August 10, 1989 (R. 93 at 27). Defendant waived a presentence 
report and chose to be sentenced immediately (R. 93 at 29). 
Judge Hanson sentenced defendant to one to fifteen years in 
prison for count one, zero to five years for count two, and one 
to fifteen years for count three. The sentences for counts one 
and two run concurrently; however, the sentence for count three 
runs consecutively to counts one and two. Additionally, the 
Judge imposed a five year to life sentence for count four to run 
concurrently with the other three sentences (R. 93 at 32-5) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 16, 1989, Deputy Dent of the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office received information that a "chop shop" 
was operating in Oakley, Utah and that items stolen in Salt Lake 
County were located there (R. 91 at 19-20). Deputy Dent went to 
Oakley and saw a stolen 1972 GMC pickup truck in a garage at 4361 
Main Street known as "Will's Auto" (R. 91 at 20, 30, 144). There 
was no plate on the truck; however the vehicle identification 
number (VIN) matched a stolen vehicle report (R. 91 at 21). 
Deputy Dent also located a stolen snowmobile at a residence near 
Kamas, Utah (R. 91 at 22, 46). 
Dent began surveillance of the garage and drove by many 
times between February 16 and 28 (R. 91 at 23). The truck was 
initially located outside the garage and was moved inside the 
garage when Dent was there on February 24 (R. 91 at 24). On 
February 28, when detectives searched the garage, the snowmobile 
had been moved to the yard outside the garage from its original 
location at the Kamas residence (R. 91 at 26). Also located 
outside the garage on February 28 was a stolen U-Haul auto 
transport trailer (R. 91 at 27-9). Inside the garage was a 
stolen U-Haul tow bar, the Ohio license plate from the trailer 
and the cowling cover from the snowmobile (R. 91 at 27-8, 30, 
31). 
The pickup truck was being dismantled on February 28 
(R. 91 at 91). Although the truck was in good condition when it 
was stolen, it was inoperable when it was returned to the owner 
(R. 91 at 125). The front end was "blown;" the hood was off; the 
motor was half torn out; the front bumper was cut off; the back 
bumper was half cut off; and all the cab mounts, motor vises and 
transmission braces had been cut off with a torch (R. 91 at 125). 
The U-Haul tow bar had been painted and the identification number 
on the trailer had been painted over (R. 91 at 28, 134) 
When the garage was searched, detectives found 
defendant and his wife inside. It was 9:05 a.m. and defendant 
was sitting downstairs in a lounge chair; his wife was upstairs 
in her nightgown (R. 91 at 32, 77, 206). The upstairs appeared to 
be a living area where the detectives found personal effects 
including furnishings, coolers, kitchen equipment, food and 
clothing which included a jacket with the name Dumas printed on 
it (R. 91 at 33, 85, 112-13). 
Defendant and his wife subleased the garage from 
William Richards (R. 91 at 146). The agreement was originally 
discussed in January, and defendant was to pay the $400 February 
rent to Richards, then lease the building from the owners 
thereafter (R. 91 at 145, 147). On February 15, defendant's wife 
gave $200 to Richards, and Richards gave her the key to the 
garage (R. 91 at 148, 154, 156). Richards stopped in at the 
garage twice and attempted to collect the remaining $200 from 
defendant, but defendant refused to pay him (R. 91 at 149-51). 
During one of these visits, Richards saw defendant working on the 
pickup truck (R. 91 at 162-63). He observed defendant's 
belongings there including tools, heaters and furniture (R. 91 at 
156). Defendant told Richards he was using the garage to repair 
cars (R. 91 at 165). 
Defendant was seen at the garage on other occasions. 
Det. Steffee saw him there on February 23 (R. 91 at 100-01). A 
neighbor saw defendant there with his wife and a small boy on 
February 12 (R. 92 at 12-13, 27). The neighbor suspected 
defendant knew something about his missing dog, so he noted the 
date on his calendar and reported his suspicions to the police 
(R. 92 at 12-13, 17-18). He thought defendant lived there when 
he observed blankets, pillows and clothing on the floor upstairs 
the following day (R. 92 at 21-22). The telephone at the garage 
was connected in defendant's wife's name (R. 91 at 197, R. 92 at 
60-1). 
Sometime in February, defendant told Rick Harkness to 
drive the GMC pickup truck to a gas station on the road to Kamas 
(R. 92 at 35-6). From there, Harkness towed a Jeep to Will's 
Auto (R. 92 at 35-6). Sometime after this event, while Harkness 
was again in Oakley working in the garage, defendant arrived 
towing a U-Haul trailer with a purple car on it (R. 92 at 38). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant was properly convicted of three separate 
counts of theft by receiving where he received the stolen goods 
on separate occasions. The critical date in a theft by receiving 
charge is when the defendant received the goods and not when the 
goods were stolen from their true owners. 
The trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to 
dismiss the case that was made in closing argument. His 
objection to the information was not timely because it should 
have been made at least five days prior to trial. 
The evidence established that defendant obtained 
possession of the property of others either knowing it was stolen 
or believing that it probably was stolen. The evidence was 
sufficient to establish that defendant was guilty of three counts 
of theft by receiving. 
Application of the habitual criminal statute to 
defendant is not ex post facto. There has been a habitual 
criminal statute in Utah since 1896. The statute does not charge 
a new offense or increase the punishment for previous offenses. 
Defendant received an erroneous separate sentence for the 
habitual criminal conviction, however, and he should be 
resentenced. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS CORRECTLY CONVICTED OF THREE 
SEPARATE COUNTS OF THEFT BY RECEIVING. 
Defendant asserts that he should not have been 
convicted for separate counts of theft by receiving for the truck 
and the snowmobile because they were both stolen from one owner 
at the same time. He claims that the State was required to prove 
that he received the items at different times in order to convict 
him of separate crimes but that the State failed to do so. He 
also contends that he should not have been convicted of a 
separate count for the theft by receiving of the U-Haul trailer 
and tow bar because the information alleged that all of the 
thefts occurred on or about February 28. Thus, he apparently 
requests this Court to combine all three counts into one 
conviction for a second degree felony since the combined value of 
the items exceeds $1000 and included an operable motor vehicle. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-412(1)(a)(i), (ii) (Supp. 1989). 
Defendant's contentions are meritless for the reasons outlined 
below. 
The information was amended during trial to allege that 
the count one theft by receiving of the pickup truck occurred 
between February 16 and 28, 1989 (R. 2, R. 92 at 61-3). 
Consequently, the information does not allege that all of the 
thefts occurred on or about the same date. Even if all of the 
- f i -
dates alleged were the same, the manner of charging the dates 
does not support defendant's theory. The information alleges 
that the thefts by receiving occurred "on or about" the dates 
alleged. The State need not establish that the theft actually 
occurred on the specific date stated but has some leeway when the 
charge is that the crime occurred "on or about" a stated date. 
State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1216 (Utah 1987); In re R.G.B., 
597 P.2d 1333, 1335 (Utah 1979). 
In fact, the evidence establishes that defendant 
actually received the items on separate occasions. The truck was 
seen in defendant's possession on February 16. The snowmobile 
was not seen in his possession until February 28. The U-Haul 
equipment was first seen in defendant's possession by Rick 
Harkness when defendant drove up with it sometime after Rick 
drove the truck to the garage (R. 92 at 38). 
Although the truck and snowmobile were stolen from 
Larry Andersen on February 4, 1989 (R. 91 at 121), defendant 
possessed the pickup truck at the earliest known date of February 
16 (R. 91 at 20). Defendant was not known to possess the 
snowmobile until February 28 (R. 91 at 26). Prior to February 
28, on February 16, the snowmobile was observed at a residence in 
Kamas owned by Vince Williams (R. 91 at 22, 46). The U-Haul 
trailer was stolen from a U-Haul dealer on February 24 and was 
not observed at defendant's garage until after Rick Harkness had 
driven the truck to Oakley. (R. 91 at 26, 130, R. 92 at 38). 
Thus, the U-Haul equipment was actually received by defendant 
after the truck and before February 28. 
As defendant concedes, if the State shows that 
defendant did not receive the items on one occasion, but that he 
did receive them on separate occasions, separate counts of theft 
by receiving may be charged. See State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203, 
206 (Utah 1983). The evidence outlined above establishes that 
defendant received each of these items on separate occasions even 
though the truck and snowmobile were stolen on the same day. 
Defendant is not entitled to include the U-Haul 
equipment in a single count with the other two items even under 
his alternative theory that the charging decision is based upon 
the date that the goods were stolen. The U-Haul equipment was 
stolen from a different victim on a different date 8 days after 
defendant was known to possess the stolen truck and weeks after 
the truck and snowmobile were stolen. Even assuming defendant's 
analysis is correct that counts one and two should be combined 
because the items were stolen from Larry Andersen on one 
occasion, they should not be combined with this count. Even if 
defendant is correct in his assumption that the counts should be 
combined based upon the date the items were taken from their true 
owners, the U-Haul items were taken in a different incident and 
could not be combined with counts one and two even under 
defendant's alternative theory. 
State v. Casias, 772 P.2d 975 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
cited by defendant, does not support his alternative position. 
Casias was charged with two separate counts of theft for having 
stolen items valued at more than $1000 and having stolen a 
firearm all at the same time from a single location. The State 
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argued that it could charge Casias for two separate offenses 
based upon the character of the goods stolen regardless of the 
fact that they were all stolen at the same time. This Court 
disagreed and held that the State could not charge separate 
counts of theft when the defendant stole the goods all at one 
time. Casias is distinguishable because the defendant in this 
case was charged with separate counts of theft by receiving 
stolen property on separate occasions. 
Defendant's reliance on Casias and his claim that the 
relevant date is the date the items were stolen are inconsistent 
with his concession that he may be charged with separate counts 
of theft by receiving if he received the items on separate dates. 
Because the evidence established that defendant received the 
items on different occasions, the three separate counts of theft 
by receiving are proper. This Court should affirm all three 
convictions. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO DEFECTS IN 
THE INFORMATION, BUT EVEN IF HE DID NOT WAIVE 
HIS OBJECTION, THE INFORMATION WAS NOT 
DEFECTIVE. 
Defendant contends that the information was defective 
because it charged theft by receiving in the language of the 
statute which provides the alternative methods of received, 
retained, disposed of, concealed, sold or withheld by which a 
person may commit the crime. Relying on State v. Ramon, 736 P.2d 
1059 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), he asserts that the State was required 
to select only one method of theft by receiving and could not 
allege the methods in the alternative. He urges that the 
information be stricken and the convictions reversed. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1), Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
12(b)(1) (1982), provides that any objection to a defect in the 
information, other than jurisdictional defects or failure to 
charge a crime, shall be raised at least five days prior to 
trial. Defendant argued during his closing argument that the 
information was defective because the crimes were charged 
alternatively (R. 92 at 80-1). Judge Hanson denied the motion 
because it was untimely (R. 92 at 107-09). 
In Ramon, unlike the present case, the defendants 
objected to the amendment of the information in which the State 
added the alternatives of "concealed, sold or withheld" on the 
first day of trial. They had previously moved for a bill of 
particulars when they received notice that the State intended to 
formally move to add the alternatives not previously charged. 
Thus, Ramon is distinguishable from this case because defendant 
did not timely raise his objection, nor move for a bill of 
particulars. 
Here, defendant did not object to the information which 
had at all times alleged the crimes in all of their alternative 
forms until after the close of the evidence at trial. The State 
may charge theft in general and need not even specify which 
variation of theft it intends to prove at trial unless the 
defendant would be prejudiced by a lack of notice. State v. 
Fowler, 745 P.2d 472, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-403 (1978). Defendant did not request a bill of particulars 
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requiring the State to specify which theory it intended to rely 
on, nor did he at any time allege he lacked notice of the crime 
charged. 
Defendant argued to the trial court, as he argues on 
appeal, that his objection was timely because the information 
failed to charge a crime because it stated all methods of 
committing the crime. The court rejected this argument as should 
this Court. The information in this case charges that defendant 
committed three acts of theft by receiving when he "received, 
retained, disposed of, concealed, sold or withheld" the property 
of others. These acts are made criminal by Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-408 (Supp. 1989). Defendant's argument that his motion was 
timely because no crime was charged is, therefore, mistaken. 
Further, even if defendant had made a timely objection, 
he would not have been entitled to anything more than a possible 
amendment of the information. The prosecutor believed that there 
are two separate theories of theft by receiving defined in § 76-
6-408 (R. 92 at 100-02). He stated that these theories are 
either that defendant received, retained or disposed of the 
property of another knowing it was stolen; or that defendant 
concealed, sold or withheld the property of another believing it 
probably was stolen. The prosecutor believed that the difference 
between the two theories was the mental state required and agreed 
that he may have been able to narrow his approach to only the 
first theory. 
Judge Hanson, on the other hand, explained that if 
defendant had requested the State to elect only one theory in a 
timely motion, he may have prevailed (R. 92 at 107-09). However, 
defendant went to trial without requesting the court to require 
the State to select which alternative it intended to prove. He 
did not request a bill of particulars. Failure to request a bill 
of particulars and to object to the information prior to trial 
results in waiver of his claim. State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 
1215 (Utah 1987). For this reason, Judge Hanson correctly held 
that defendant had waived any objection he may have had to the 
manner in which the crimes were charged and this Court need not 
consider whethei: there are two theories of theft by receiving or 
whether the State would have been required to select only one 
theory if timely requested to do so. 
POINT III 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
JUDGE'S VERDICT OF GUILTY OF ALL THREE COUNTS 
OF THEFT BY RECEIVING. 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that defendant received the property of others knowing 
that it was stolen or believing that it probably was stolen. 
Specifically, he asserts that there was no evidence connecting 
him to the Will's Auto building to establish that he had 
possession of the stolen items. A review of the record reveals 
that there was evidence from which Judge Hanson could conclude 
that defendant received stolen property and his findings were not 
clearly erroneous. See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-93 
(Utah 1987)(standard of review of claim of insufficient evidence 
in bench trial is clearly erroneous standard of Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a)). This Court should defer to the court's determinations of 
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credibility of the witnesses, State v. Kelley# 770 P.2d 98, 99 
(Utah 1988), and determine after a review of the evidence and the 
court's findings that the findings are supported by the evidence. 
The facts, which are stated more fully in the Statement 
of Facts above, are summarized as follows: 
The truck, snowmobile and U-Haul equipment were found 
in and around Will's Auto. Defendant was at Will's Auto on the 
day of the search and appeared to be living there with his wife. 
Defendant subleased Will's Auto from the lessee. Defendant's 
wife paid one half of the month's rent for the building and 
obtained a key from the lessee. The telephone in the building 
was connected in her name. 
Defendant was seen working on the pickup truck inside 
Will's. The truck had been partially dismantled. The snowmobile 
was parked outside of the building and its cowling cover was 
inside the building. 
The identification numbers on the U-Haul trailer had 
been painted over, and its license plate was removed and placed 
inside the building. The tow-bar had been painted. Defendant 
used the trailer to transport a purple car to Will's. 
While defendant denied that he subleased the garage and 
claimed that he had not been there prior to the few days 
preceding his arrest, Judge Hanson did not believe defendant (R. 
92 at 112-13). Instead, Judge Hanson chose to believe the 
neighbor who placed defendant at the garage as early as February 
12. Judge Hanson also chose to believe that defendant caused the 
truck to be in Oakley by telling Rick Harkness to drive it there 
(R. 92 at 112). 
From this evidence, the court could determine that 
defendant was guilty of the crimes charged, and the court's 
findings were not clearly erroneous. Defendant's convictions 
should be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF BEING A 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL. 
Defendant contends that he was improperly convicted of 
being a habitual criminal because one of the crimes supporting 
the conviction occurred before the effective date of the habitual 
criminal statute. He asserts that the application of the 
habitual criminal statute to him is ex post facto because it 
prescribes punishment for a crime committed before the enactment 
of the statute. 
Defendant's claim that there was no habitual criminal 
statute prior to enactment of the current criminal code is 
incorrect. The previous habitual criminal statute was enacted in 
1896 and remained in effect until passage of the current code 
provision in 1975. State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 1275, 1276 (Utah 
1978). Thus, his argument that being a habitual criminal was not 
a status that existed when his prior crimes were committed fails. 
Furthermore, the habitual criminal statute is not an ex 
post facto law. A law is ex post facto under the United States 
Constitution when it makes criminal an act that was innocent when 
done, increases the punishment for a crime after its commission, 
or allows conviction on less proof than was required when the act 
was committed. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 32 (Utah 1989). 
The habitual criminal statute does not impose new or increased 
punishment for the prior crime. Instead, it increases the 
punishment imposed for crimes committed by a person who has been 
previously convicted. State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 145 (Utah 
1989) (quoting Clark v. Turner, 283 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D. Utah 
1968)). Thus, its application to defendant is not ex post 
facto. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm defendant's convictions and remand the case to the 
trial court for resentencing. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this I day of February, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L.^JO^REN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Although defendant fails to complain about it on appeal, he 
received a separate sentence for the habitual criminal 
enhancement which is inconsistent with Stilling, 770 P.2d at 145 
Accordingly, this Court should remand the case for resentencing 
consistent with Stilling. 
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